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This study uses secondary data from the past ten seasons to explore key issues germane to Major 
League Baseball.  Focusing on attendance, payroll, performance, and the cost of attending, 
several key relationships were identified.  Huge disparities in spending are documented.  
Perhaps most importantly, there is a meaningful relationship between performance and 
attendance.  Equally important is the relationship between performance and the team’s payroll.  
Other relationships were documented and suggestions are articulated.  These suggestions 




Sports marketing has surged to the forefront of discussions among marketing practitioners and 
academicians worldwide.  While we would be remiss if we failed to acknowledge that this 
discipline comprises two primary domains – mainly the marketing of sports products and the 
marketing of nonsports products via of the creation of a sports overlay – we recognize that the 
discipline is driven by the spectator sports component of the industry.  While the sports that 
appeal to the marketplace vary significantly from one country to another, two questions continue 
to emerge.  One of the questions that has circulated across the media and the blogosphere in the 
United States since the New York Yankees cruised their way to the 2009 World Series 
championship is that of whether or not the wealthier teams are simply buying championships.  
More succinctly stated: is a team’s payroll directly correlated with a team’s performance on the 
field of play? 
 
The second commonly posed question concerns the relationship between winning and 
attendance.  Logic would imply that a winning team represents a superior product.  Common 
wisdom is that consumers – fans in this case – are willing to pay premium prices for higher 
quality products.  Thus two questions emerge. What is the nature of the relationship between the 
number of games won during the regular season and the number of fans in the seats?  And since 
higher costs generally translate into higher prices, what is the relationship between payroll and 
the cost of attending an MLB game?  In line with these questions is that of whether or not there 
is a meaningful relationship between the cost of attending and the number of wins accrued by the 
team.   
 
While questions such as these are relevant to any sport in any country, this study will focus on 
Major League Baseball in the United States.  We begin with a brief look at a major point of 
distinction between spectator sports and the typical industry such as the automotive 
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manufacturing sector.  With the key difference delineated, the focus then shifts to that of 
examining the existing literature. 
 
SPECTATOR SPORTS: A PARADOXICAL PARADIGM 
  
 In mainstream industry, a higher cost generally translates into a disadvantage.  Recently, 
Ford Motor sought concessions from its labor force so that it would be on a level playing field as 
it sought to compete head-to-head with General Motors and Chrysler.  When the United Auto 
Workers voted not to grant these concessions, the immediate response by Ford management was 
that the cost disadvantage under which Ford was operating would have negative consequences in 
the future.  Ironically, such arguments are seldom articulated in professional sports.  While the 
small market teams complain that they are at a disadvantage because they don’t have as much 
money to spend on their labor force, the large market teams continue to entice the best free 
agents with lucrative contract offers.  The New York Yankees’ payroll for 2009 was 
approximately $202 million dollars.  This included $35.91 million spent on the top free agents in 
the off-season signing period, C. C. Sabathia and Mark Teixiera.  Yet at the same time, there are 
numerous examples of teams spending small fortunes on their roster and failing to make the 
playoffs or even play at a level above the five hundred (.500) clip.  One of the best recent 
examples involved the 2008 Detroit Tigers.  After acquiring a bevy of new players including 
Dontrelle Willis and Miguel Cabrera, the fans’ confidence swelled along with the team’s payroll.  
However, the league’s second highest payroll at nearly $139 million dollars failed to achieve an 
acceptable return on that investment.  The team won less than 46 percent of its games and fell far 
short of making the postseason playoffs.  Yet the fans’ hope prior to the opening game of the 
season caused ticket sales to increase substantially over the original expectation.  So, some might 
ask if the large payroll creates expectations that result in ticket sales such that a failure to 
perform on the field does not result in a significant decline that season.  Conversely, an 
overachieving team with a smaller payroll might have more ticket sales during the course of the 
season.  Thus, it could be that performance is a direct influence on season attendance.  Such is 
the paradox associated with professional sports, especially those such as MLB that do not impose 
a hard salary cap on team payrolls. 
 
Another anomaly is the relationship between price and demand.  Higher prices are typically 
associated with lower levels of demand.  Such a relationship may not be the case for spectator 
sports.  However, consumers are known to pay for quality.  We pay more for a Lexus than we do 
for a similar Toyota.  The Lexus may be better, or it may simply be perceived as a superior 
product.  Regardless of the reality, Lexus prices are higher.  Thus it may be that higher ticket 
prices are deemed acceptable when those prices can be attributed to the purchase of a superior 
product.  For instance, despite having the highest average ticket price in Major League Baseball 
($72.97), the New York Yankees drew the second largest attendance for the 2009 season 




At the forefront of the literature that explores spending on salaries in Major League Baseball is 
the book, Moneyball, by Michael Lewis (2003).  Among the assertions offered in this oft-cited 
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book is that the baseball labor market is mispriced.  As a consequence, it is argued many teams 
inflate their payrolls in an unproductive effort to improve their performance on the field of play.  
While it is believed that this has been the case for many years, there is an emerging belief that 
more attention is being paid to the link between pay and performance.  Supporting this premise is 
the finding that the correlation between a team’s payroll and its winning percentage has 
improved dramatically in recent years (Hakes and Sauer, 2007).   In essence, it is believed that 
this more attentive mindset emerged with Billy Beane’s exploitation of this phenomenon 
(commonly referred to as Sabermetrics) during his tenure as the Oakland Athletics general 
manager over a five-season period from 1999 through 2003.  It is further believed that this 
mantle has been passed down to Dan O’Dowd, general manager of the Colorado Rockies (Van 
Riper, 2009).  Yet despite this transition, outcry against the big spenders is commonplace.  The 
culmination of the 2009 World Series was often punctuated by accusations that the Yankees 
bought yet another championship with the best team that money could buy (Reiter, 2009).  As 
such, we have witnessed renewed calls for a salary cap in Major League Baseball (Marchman, 
2009). 
 
Why do teams make such a concerted effort to buy talent?  It is argued that winning and 
attendance go hand-in-hand for most teams.  However, despite this assertion, it has been stated 
that the direction of the causal relationship is not so obvious (Davis, 2008).  Regardless of this 
shortcoming, research has shown that fans subjectively evaluate the probability that their team 
will win a game.  And based upon that probability, their decision to attend a game is impacted.  
Interestingly, Knowles, Sherony, and Haupert (1992) estimated that attendance is maximized 
when the home team’s probability of winning is .60.  Another study by Rascher (1999) offered 
his estimate that it is a probability of .66 that results in the attainment of the maximum number of 
fans who choose to attend a game.  Furthermore, it has been suggested that the correlation 
between attendance and performance has strengthened in recent years (Schmidt and Berri, 2006).  
 
As early as 1978, the literature on professional sports began to explore the relationship between 
team payrolls and the cost of attending a game.  Major League Baseball has been noted because 
of the strength of its union (the MLBPA) and the inception of arbitration some thirty years ago.  
Shortly thereafter, it was surmised that the resultant increases in the salaries of MLB players 
“have inflated ticket prices” (Staudohar, 1978).  There is credence given to the argument that 
higher player salaries have a direct relationship with the cost of attending an MLB game.  In 
1998, it was noted that eight of the ten teams with the highest aggregate payrolls were teams that 
fell within the list of the ten teams with the highest average ticket prices (Fatsis, 1998).  More 
recently, a terse question was posed: “How have player salaries ruined baseball?”  The two most 
commonly articulated replies to that question are that the trend has destroyed competitive 
balance and that these high salaries have resulted in higher ticket prices (Glazer, 2002).  
However, there are some detractors to those arguments.  The detractors argue that the steep 
increase in ticket prices is not a result of increased player salaries; rather, it can be attributed to a 
heightened interest in baseball on the part of the fans and the construction of smaller ballparks – 
a phenomenon which has essentially decreased the supply of seats available to the fans.  So, the 
argument is that it has been this increase in demand coupled with a concurrent reduction in 
supply which precipitated the dramatic increases in ticket prices over the past 15 years (Glazer, 
2002).   Therefore, if we accept a basic premise of macroeconomic theory, then the equilibrium 
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price should have been expected to creep higher.  This is the same argument put forth by 
Jonathan Mariner, CFO of the Florida Marlins, when he stated that “it’s supply and demand.  
You charge more because you have more demand for tickets…and nicer facilities.”  Nowhere 
does Mariner say that ticket prices went up because payroll went up.  In fact, he could not offer 
this as a reason because the Marlins’ ticket prices had increased despite a dramatic reduction in 
payroll (Fatsis, 1998). In an extension of the assessment of the cost of attending, one recent study 
expanded the focus beyond ticket prices.  Coates and Humphreys (2007) used the Fan Cost Index 
(FCI) as the independent variable.  The FCI takes into account the aggregate cost for a family of 
four to attend a professional sports event in the United States and Canada.  Their research 
covered three of the four major North American leagues (the NHL was omitted).  The evidence 
emanating from this study appeared to document the fact that fans are somewhat ambivalent 
since the nature of the demand curve was found to be inelastic. 
 
Much of the published material on pricing is from the popular press.  One article in 
SportBusiness International offered the assessment that fans are turned off by high prices (Smith, 
2005).  An earlier article was more critical as evidenced by its title: “Hey Fans, Sit on It” (Swift, 
2000).  The prevailing argument is that we are witnessing the act of pricing the everyday fan out 
of the game.  Negative commentary such as this led Fullerton (2010, p. 534) to offer his 
assessment that “price is perhaps the most criticized aspect of the strategies employed by 
marketers of spectator sports.”  This begs the question as to whether or not there is a relationship 
such that higher team payrolls contribute to higher prices that make it more difficult for real fans 




Two distinct assessment periods are addressed in this study.  First to be examined is the 2009 
season.  Then the ten-year period from 2000 through 2009 is subjected to the same scrutiny.  
Thus, any relationships among the variables in the data set are addressed from both a short-term 
and a long-term perspective. 
 
For both timeframes, the objective is one of identifying relationships between sets of relevant 
variables that are commonly discussed in the media and by the fans.  As such, the seven 
objectives germane to this study are to determine the nature of the relationship between: 
 attendance and performance (as measured by the number of games won); 
 opening day payroll (measured in constant (2009) dollars) and performance; 
 opening day payroll index (team payroll compared to average payroll) and performance; 
 team payroll (measured in constant (2009) dollars) and ticket prices (in constant dollars); 
 performance and ticket prices (measured in constant (2009) dollars); 
 attendance and ticket prices (measured in constant (2009) dollars); and  




Data were gathered from an array of reputable secondary sources.  These sources include 
MLB.com, ESPN.com, teammarketing.com, and the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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(www.bls.gov/CPI/).  The data collected covered a ten-season period from 2000 through 2009.  
The database consisted of the team’s payroll and a payroll index.  This index was calculated by 
dividing a team’s payroll by the average payroll for the year under scrutiny. For example, the 
Yankees’ 2009 payroll was $201,449,289 while the average team payroll was $88,336,287.  The 
resultant payroll index of 2.28 indicates that the Yankees’ payroll was 228 percent of the average 
team payroll (or 128 percent more) for the 2009 season.  Since dollar values are impacted by 
inflation, the dollar amount was also indexed.  By using the Consumer Price Index (CPI), each 
payroll was adjusted so as to be stated in 2009 dollars. The number of wins and the aggregate 
home attendance were included within the database.  The average ticket price and the 
corresponding Fan Cost Index (FCI) were gleaned from statistics published by Team Marketing 
Report.  The final piece of data was a dummy variable that was used to indicate whether or not 
the team had moved into a new stadium at the start of the season. Other than issue of moving into 
a new stadium which was coded as a binary (0, 1) variable, each of the other variables in the data 
set produced ratio-scaled data.    
 
When the analyses were performed for the 2009, the current dollar values were used for payroll 
and ticket prices.  When the ten-year assessments were done, current dollars were transformed.  
In some analyses, the dollar amounts for the years 2000 through 2009 were indexed using 2009 
as the base year; thus each measure reflects the equivalent cost expressed in terms of the 2009 
dollar.  The indexing criterion was the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as of April of the 
corresponding year.   
 
Each of the research objectives was assessed using bivariate (Pearson) correlation analysis.  
However, since the data - in essence - represent a census, measures of statistical significance 
were deemed inappropriate.  So rather than report this measure, assessments are made regarding 




A number of the pairs of variables articulated in the research objectives section exhibited 
correlation coefficients that are best characterized as managerially significant.  Such 
relationships were documented in both the one-year and the ten-year studies. 
 
The initial objective was that of determining the nature of the relationship between a team’s 
attendance and its performance.  For the 2009 season, the top performing team with 103 victories 
and a World Series title was the New York Yankees; the team drew a total of 3,719,358 fans to 
the park for their 81 regular season home games.  This attendance placed the Yankees second in 
MLB – falling a mere 42,000 fans behind the Los Angeles Dodgers.  Conversely, the worst 
performing team was the Washington Nationals.  Their 59 wins translated into a season 
attendance of 1,817,280.  This figure placed the team 25th out of the 30 MLB teams.  This 
anecdotal evidence of a relationship between these two variables is further supported by the 
corresponding coefficient of correlation.  For the 2009 season, that measure was .680 whereas 
the comparable figure for the ten-year period was .524. The correlation is in the sought direction 
as there is a direct relationship between the two variables.  Higher levels of performance are 
accompanied by higher levels of attendance.  Furthermore, the correlation coefficients are 
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reasonably high.  Yet at the same time, it is apparent that other factors are perhaps even more 
important.  The coefficient of determination (r2) of .275 for 2009 and .462 for the aggregate 
period implies that more than half of the variation in attendance is determined by factors other 
than performance.   Still, the results provide some credence to the argument that paying to bring 
in quality free agents can represent a good investment if the free agents contribute to produce a 
better product on the field of play.  This assertion begs the question as to whether or not higher 
payrolls do, in fact, translate into better performance as measured by the number of wins 
achieved by the team during the course of the regular season. 
 
Objective two was that of determining the nature of the relationship between a team’s payroll 
and its performance.  For the 2009 season, the actual dollar amounts are used.  However, for the 
ten-year study, the payroll figures were adjusted so as to eliminate the confounding impact of 
inflation.  To accomplish this adjustment, the salary data for 2000 through 2008 were indexed 
using 2009 as the base year.  As a result, each payroll figure is expressed in terms of its 
equivalent value vis-à-vis the 2009 dollar.  In each case, a meaningful result was in evidence.  
For the 2009 season, the coefficient of correlation for the pairing of team payroll and 
performance was .504.  Likewise, the corresponding measure for the ten-year period was .458.  
Once again, the direction of the relationship was positive and the coefficient was modestly high.  
Thus, it can be concluded that there is a meaningful relationship that is characterized by higher 
payrolls producing a higher level of performance on the field.  And while there are exceptions to 
this rule – after all, the correlation coefficient was not 1.0 – teams that spend the least on payroll 
tend to be among the poorer performers.  Furthermore, the stronger relationship in 2009 supports 
the earlier assertion by Hakes and Sauer (2003) that the ability of general managers to make 
wiser decisions regarding player acquisition continues to improve.  However, it somewhat 
contradicts research by baseball statistician Tom Tango whose research indicated that the 
measure of correlation between spending and performance in MLB was .63 (Cameron, 2009).   
 
The third objective used a meaningful manipulation of the salary data.  Rather than looking at 
dollar amounts, a payroll index was calculated.  As such, the measure reflects a team’s level of 
spending relative to the league-wide average.  The rationale is that it may not be how much a 
team spends; rather it is how much each team spends in comparison to its opponents that is more 
important as a mediating variable that impacts performance.  As such, a payroll index of 200 is 
characteristic of a team that spent two times that of the average team on its payroll.  Conversely, 
an index of 50 indicates that the team under scrutiny spent only half as much on its players as did 
the average team in the year in question.  Once more, meaningful correlations were documented.  
For the 2009 season, the measure was .504.  For the ten-year period, it was .465.  Interestingly, 
the correlation coefficient for the 2009 season (.504) was exactly the same as that resulting from 
the use of the actual payroll.  For the ten year period, the use of the index produced a slightly 
higher correlation coefficient (.465) than that which was achieved when using the inflation 
adjusted payroll (.458).  Each of these measures supports the premise that spending money on 
player salaries will result in enhanced performance as measured by the team’s number of wins.   
 
The fourth objective begins the examination of ticket prices.  For virtually every industry, higher 
costs of production translate into higher prices for consumers.  Thus the question is a simple one.  
Does a higher payroll result in higher ticket prices?  Using raw cost data for 2009, the coefficient 
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of correlation was .836.  Similar, albeit somewhat weaker, results were found when the adjusted 
cost data over the ten year period were used.  In that analysis, the value of r was .644.  
Coefficients of correlation exceeding .8 are rare in this type of empirical study of actual market 
conditions.  But the reality is that the results may surprise few people, especially the critics of 
Major League Baseball.  Those who argue that professional sports are pricing the fan out of the 
game will point to results such as these while declaring that the high salaries paid to today’s 
athletes are detrimental and may ultimately drive the everyday fan away from the stadium in 
favor of experiencing the game as a member of the media-based audience.  
 
Objective five involves the assessment of the relationship between ticket prices and performance.  
Conventional wisdom would lead one to believe that since higher salaries produce more wins, 
then it is only logical to assume that there would also be a meaningful positive relationship 
between ticket prices and performance.  Such is indeed the case; however, the relationship may 
not be as strong as one might have envisioned.  For the 2009 season, the observed measure of 
correlation was .400.  For the ten year period, prices were adjusted to account for inflation in the 
same way that payroll data have been adjusted so as to be stated in terms of the dollar in 2009. 
For this longer period, the observed coefficient of correlation was even lower at .280.  These 
results indicate that there are a myriad of factors other than performance in any given year that 
influence ticket prices.  Some fans appear to receive a bargain while watching higher quality 
teams whereas other fans pay a premium for tickets to watch inferior teams.    
 
The sixth objective addresses the relationship between ticket prices and attendance.  As noted 
earlier, most industries face the reality that higher prices for their products translate into lower 
levels of demand.  Major League Baseball is not burdened by the reality of an elastic demand 
curve.  For the recently completed 2009 season, the relationship between these two variables was 
captured by a coefficient of correlation of .596.  Using the inflation adjusted prices for the past 
ten seasons, the comparable measure was slightly lower at .546.  Yet the most compelling aspect 
of these statistics is that the relationship is positive.  In other words, higher prices are associated 
with higher attendance.  This might cause one to ponder if higher prices create higher demand or 
if higher demand drives ticket prices up.  Alternatively, the real issue could be that both of these 
variables are related to performance.  A better product sells for higher prices while 
simultaneously attracting more interested buyers. 
 
The seventh and final objective addresses the relationship between attendance and the Fan Cost 
Index (FCI).  The FCI is a measure that estimates the total cost for a family of four to attend a 
baseball game in each city.  In 2009, the FCI for MLB was $196.89.  The FCI not only includes 
four average-priced tickets ($26.64), but it also takes into account other likely expenditures 
including parking, beverages, food, programs, and souvenirs (Team Marketing Report, 2009).  
As might be expected, the FCI is strongly correlated with ticket prices.  For example, the 
correlation coefficient for 2009 was .977.  For the 2000-09 period, the measure was .960.  
Despite these high values, it was decided that this analysis should still be included since many 
outside observers are quick to include the costs specific to the FCI as factors that might push 
some fans away.  The correlation coefficients resulting from the assessment of the relationship 
between the FCI and attendance closely approximate those from when ticket prices were used 
instead of the FCI.   For 2009, the figure was .585.  As with ticket prices, when the examination 
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involves a monetary unit over the ten year period, the dollar amount was adjusted to reflect 
constant dollars.  Taking this adjustment into account, the corresponding measure for the ten-
year period was .568.  Higher values for the fan cost index are associated with higher attendance.  
Once more, the likely explanation is that better teams can command higher prices for their tickets 
and for the various concessions sold at the stadium. So if we were to try to assign cause and 
effect, it is likely that higher attendance is the cause while the higher cost of attending is the 




Spending on player payroll appears to pay off.  However, the overarching caveat is that it is 
about spending wisely.  Expenditures that do not improve the team’s performance may go 
unrewarded at the box office.  This confirms the basic premise put forth by Lewis (2003) in his 
popular book, Moneyball.  In documenting the success of Oakland Athletics General Manager, 
Billy Beane, the key was about investing in players that would provide a meaningful return on 
the investment.  Beane put forth the argument that some positions are more valuable than others.  
Thus, there is more to consider than player statistics.  So, two teams with identical payrolls may 
have vastly different results on the field of play.  As noted in the Wall Street Journal, “supersize 
payrolls” do not guarantee a team’s success.  The 2003 Detroit Tigers paid approximately $1.3 
million for each of its victories that season, hardly representing a sound ROI (St. John, 2003).  
 
Further exacerbating the decision to invest large sums of money in long-term player contracts is 
the reality that the coefficient of correlation for payroll and performance hovers around .5.  
Undoubtedly, general managers would like to see that number move higher.  Of course the critics 
will tell them that the correlation would be stronger if only they would quit making bad 
investments.  Mike Hampton signed an eight-year contract to pitch for the Colorado Rockies.  
The first year return on the field of play for their $15.1 million per year investment was a record 
of 14-13 with an Earned Run Average (ERA) of 5.12. This was followed the next season with a 
record of 7-15 to accompany his ERA of 6.15.  Bad investments have led to teams dumping 
salary.  While most MLB contracts are guaranteed, teams either trade high salary players or 
refrain from resigning them when their contracts expire.  One team with a history of dumping 
salary is the Florida Marlins.  In 2009, we saw it with the Cleveland Indians.  In the current off-
season, there are rumors of the Detroit Tigers shopping players around in an effort to reduce its 
$132 million payroll. 
 
It might be wise to look at individual teams over time.  It could be that the observed relationships 
are less pronounced in some markets.  For instance, the Chicago Cubs – often relegated to being 
recognized as the lovable losers – may find that attendance is relatively stable irrespective of its 
performance on the field.  As such, it might impact the mindset of a team’s new owners and 
general manager as they contemplate investing to bring in free agents or to retain their own 
players over time.  Alternatively, a team like the Detroit Tigers finds that its attendance is 
strongly tied to the performance of the team.  Thus, the onus may be on management to invest in 
players who can immediately contribute to the success of the team even if they are seeking to 
reduce the payroll for the 2010 season. 
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Another key question is one of a lag.  Perhaps attendance is more a function of preseason 
expectations.  Teams that are expected to perform well often see dramatic increases in the 
preseason sale of season tickets, partial season tickets, and individual game tickets prior to the 
first pitch of the season being thrown.  These optimistic ticket buyers may abandon the team 
such that empty seats for which tickets were sold ultimately count in the attendance figure.  
Thus, an underperforming team may have a higher level of attendance than its actual 
performance would deserve – or than it actually drew to the stadium.  But some of these buyers 
will still show up because they bought the tickets even though their expectations have diminished 
in conjunction with the team’s performance.  Thus, it might be the following season when the 
real decline in ticket sales is incurred. 
 
There are also a number of uncontrollable variables that influence performance and attendance.  
Key players get injured.  They cannot contribute, but they still get paid.  Players emerge 
unexpectedly as high performers.  Rookies have great seasons or a veteran player has a breakout 
year.  These players may be locked into contracts such that they are unable to reap the rewards 
that they and their agents feel they deserve.  The bottom line is that they produce positive results, 
often at bargain prices.  However, when it comes time for arbitration or free agency, they will be 
able to reap the benefits of their past production.  Going back to Billy Beane in Moneyball, he 
states that it is essential that players are paid for what they can provide in the future rather than 
what they have done in the past.  As a result, older high profile athletes such as Barry Bonds may 
find that there is little or no demand for their services.  Other uncontrollable factors involve the 
visiting team.  A higher quality schedule may bring in more of your own fans whereas a visiting 
team that travels well may result in an influx of fans of the opposing team.  In this era of 
interleague play and unbalanced schedules, this aspect of the competition varies significantly 
from year to year. 
 
Major League Baseball does not have a hard salary cap, hence the dramatic disparity in team 
payrolls. In 2009, the highest payroll belonged to the New York Yankees while the lowest 
belonged to the Florida Marlins.  The difference was a staggering $164,635,289.  Part of this 
difference can be attributed to the ability of large market teams to generate huge sums of revenue 
from their media contracts. Yet part of it comes from the reluctance of team ownership and 
management to spend the money required to put a competitive team on the field.  This reality has 
led some observers to offer two suggestions to MLB.  First, there should be consideration of the 
implementation of a hard salary cap.  No longer should teams be allowed to spend more than the 
soft cap stipulates by simply paying a luxury tax.  Secondly, if there is a ceiling, there should be 
a floor.  With such a stipulation in place, each team would be required to spend at least the 
designated minimum amount on its player payroll.  The assumption is that they would not want 
to overpay a group of below average players; therefore they would invest in better players who 
would help them win more games – and attract more paying customers.  While not wanting all 
30 teams to end up with a record of 81-81, it is believed that the presence of a ceiling and a floor 
would create greater parity within MLB.  According to Bob DuPuy, the COO of MLB, “There 
are still concerns at the top and bottom.  The goal would be to get a tighter range that would 
ensure that even more than 20 clubs at Labor Day would still have a chance to compete for 
playoff spots – that playoff spots are based on skill and talent and blossoming stars and not just 
on plugging holes with economics” (Wilner, 2006, p. 8). 
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Properly done, increased spending on payroll manifests itself into a higher quality team.  Higher 
quality means more wins which translate into demand.  The resultant increases in demand help to 
create an inelastic demand curve which in turn provides pricing flexibility (Pan et al. 1999; Fort 
2004; Coates and Humphreys, 2007).  This pricing flexibility produces increases in revenue 
which allow the team to overcome the cost disadvantage incurred as a result of the increased 
payroll.  A recent article in the Wall Street Journal referred to this reality as Bottom-Line Ball 
(Adams, 2007).  In essence, this phenomenon is nothing more than a calculation of ROI.  But of 
course, the difficulty lies in determining the value of a player to place in the numerator of the 
requisite equation.  Only recently have we seen an effort to arrive at that bottom line figure.  At 
the forefront of this effort is J.C. Bradbury, author of the book, The Baseball Economist: The 
Real Game Exposed (2007).  And as noted earlier, it is generally believed that today’s general 




This study has documented a number of key relationships within the realm of Major League 
Baseball.  However, there are many other variables that influence performance and attendance.  
For example, a team moving towards 85 victories but still competing for a division 
championship may draw more fans than a team progressing towards 93 victories while already 
being eliminated from post-season competition. Future studies should seek to identify and 
incorporate these variables.  It is also evident, just within the data set used in this study, that 
there is significant multicollinearity.  So, in addition to incorporating additional variables, future 
research should expand beyond a series of bivariate analyses.  Multivariate analyses such as 
multiple regression or structural equation modeling may help to clarify some of the uncertainty 
by explaining more of the variation in the dependent variables.  It would also be interesting to 
replicate this study for a North American sports league that has had a hard salary cap in place 
over the past ten years.  The dilemma there is that many teams play to near capacity crowds for 
an entire season.  For example, it is hard to imagine a Green Bay Packers’ game that is not sold 
out.  Thus, comparing MLB to the NFL might be the proverbial comparison of apples to oranges.  
 
We will never be able to accurately predict attendance at regular season MLB games; however, 
we will continue to look for models that improve our predictive powers.  In doing so, perhaps 
sports entities can better determine how to better invest so as to improve their product on the 
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